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We carry out a Monte-Carlo simulation of a standard portfolio
management strategy involving derivatives, to estimate the sensitiv-
ity of its downside risk to a change of mean-reversion of the under-
lyings. We ﬁnd that the higher the intensity of mean-reversion, the
lower the probability of reaching a pre-determined loss level. This
phenomenon appears of large statistical signiﬁcance for large enough
loss levels. We also ﬁnd that the higher the mean-reversion intensity
of the underlyings, the longer the expected time to reach those loss
levels. The simulations suggest that selecting underlyings with high
mean-reversion eﬀect is a natural way to reduce the downside risk of
those widely traded assets.
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11 Introduction
Most of the worst ﬁnancial disasters since the 70s have been caused by deriva-
tives. For instance in the early 90s, Barings Bank lost $1bn after dubious
trades with interest rates futures, causing in turn the bankruptcy of this
well-established bank. In 1998, Long Term Capital Management lost $4bn
on somewhat similar products resulting as well in bankruptcy. More recently
in January 2008, the French bank Soci´ et´ e G´ en´ erale realized a record loss
of $7.1bn after dubious trades on standard derivatives. Given the severe
losses incurred with those products, and their always increasing volume of
trades, both practitioners and regulators have sought managerial techniques
to reduce the downside of derivative portfolios.
In practice, the common strategy to reduce and/or to control the down-
side risk of derivatives is to liquidate a portfolio once a given level of losses is
reached. This practice is called benchmarking, and it uses for portfolios both
of equities and derivatives (see Pedersen [11], Basak et al. [2] and Demirer
and Lien [3] for more standard stock portfolios, see also Lakshman [9] for
other methods and their relative cost). Leoni [10] points out that bench-
marking actually achieves the reverse eﬀect than expected; that is, bench-
marking actually aggravates the downside of derivative portfolios. There is
thus a need to isolate factors, such as appropriate classes of assets, capa-
ble of reducing the downside risk of derivative portfolios without involving
drastic managerial intervention such as benchmarking. The current paper es-
tablishes, through a Monte-Carlo simulation, how the mean-reversion of the
2underlyings dramatically aﬀects the downside risk of derivative portfolios.
Bakshi et al. [1] argues that models where underlyings exhibit mean-
reversion and stochastic volatility provide the best dynamic hedges and price
estimations, even for out-of-sample predictions. The model of Heston [6]
provides such an example, and there are large empirical evidence that this
model largely outperforms for those purposes standard models such as the
Black-Scholes’ framework. We focus on Heston’s model to carry out a Monte-
Carlo estimation of the downside risk of a standard management strategy of
a derivative portfolio; the point is to estimate how sensitive the downside
risk is to a change in mean-reversion of the underlying.
The Monte-Carlo simulation shows that, for every loss level considered in
the experiment, the higher the intensity of mean-reversion of the underlyings,
the lower the probability of reaching a loss level. This phenomenon is of large
statistical signiﬁcance for large enough loss levels (15% and above). The sec-
ond ﬁnding is that, for every loss level, the higher the mean-reversion inten-
sity, the longer the expected time to reach those loss levels. Our Monte-Carlo
experiment strongly suggests that selecting underlyings with high mean-
reversion intensity – a property that can be easily detected in statistical
tests, is a natural way to reduce the downside risk of derivative portfolios
without involving benchmarking and other costly managerial practices.
The basic intuition for this result is that, when exhibiting strong mean-
reversion eﬀects, the sample paths of the underlyings tend to be more con-
centrated in a probabilistic sense to the mean of the stochastic process (see
Grimmett and Stirzaker [5] Ch. 13 for more on this issue). When dealing
3with risk-neutral dynamics, the mean of the price dynamics for the underly-
ings is typically the risk-free rate. Therefore, risk-neutral price trajectories of
the underlyings are increasingly unlikely to exhibit large and permanent de-
viations from this rate, as the intensity of mean-reversion increases. Since for
most derivatives the extreme payoﬀs, either positive or negative, are obtained
when the underlyings’ returns are far oﬀ the risk-free return, the reduction
in downside risk obtains naturally for most derivatives. The same intuition
also shows that, by reducing the downside risk this way, the likelihood of
obtaining large positive payoﬀs is also reduced.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the exper-
iment; in Section 3 we give the empirical results about the probability of
reaching a given loss level as a function of the mean-reversion intensity; in
Section 4 we give the empirical results about the expected time of reaching
a given loss level as a function of the mean-reversion intensity; Section 4
contains some concluding remarks.
2 The experiment
In this section, we describe the model, assumptions and trading strategies
that we use to carry out our Monte-Carlo simulation. We ﬁrst describe
four classes of basic options, and the way to form our portfolio with those
options. We will then describe our assumptions about the law of motion of
the underlyings, which are those described in Heston [6]. We choose this law
of motion because it has performed well empirically when pricing derivatives
4as pointed out in Bakshi et al. [1]; it has actually outperformed most of the
standard models such as the Geometric Brownian Motions studied in Leoni
[10].
2.1 The options
The portfolio formation, and classes of options are exactly the same as in
Leoni [10], we repeat them for sake of completeness. Even if the experiment
is the same up to the choice of the law of motion for the underlyings, the
objectives and ﬁndings are unrelated to those in the previous reference. We
consider 400 diﬀerent options, which are partitioned into four classes of 100
options each. Every option has a maturity of T = 3 months, starting with
the same common date.
• Class 1. 100 cash-or-nothing options with strike price K = 49 and
end-payment Q = 10, each of then written on a diﬀerent underlying.
The payoﬀ at time T of the cash-or-nothing option is Q if ST > K and
0 otherwise, where ST is the price of the underlying in 3 months.
• Class 2. 100 lookback options, each of them written on a diﬀerent
underlying. The payoﬀ of a lookback option is ST−min(S), where
min(S) is the minimal price of the underlying between 0 and T.
• Class 3. 100 Asian options, each of them written on a diﬀerent under-
lying. The payoﬀ of one Asian option is max{0, ST − ¯ S}, where ¯ S is
the mean of underlying price between 0 and T.
5• Class 4. 100 European calls with strike price K = 49, each of them
written on a diﬀerent underlying. The payoﬀ at the end of the 3 months
is max{0, ST − K}.
2.2 Portfolio formation
We now describe how our portfolio is formed. The initial wealth of w0 =
1,000,000 is equally allocated among the four classes of options. In every
class of options, the wealth allocated to this class is equally distributed across
all of those options. That is, if wj is the wealth allocated to Class j, then for
every option in this class we purchase at current market price, given in Table
2.3 described later so as to match risk-neutral valuation of those assets, a
number of contracts whose total value amounts to wj/100 monetary units
(we implicitly assume that the options are inﬁnitely indivisible to simplify
the analysis, and without any signiﬁcant loss of generality).
Once the ﬁrst time horizon (3 months) is reached and the payoﬀs of all
of the options are realized, the proceeds are reinvested in a similar portfolio
in the same manner as above. We call a quarter any of such times where
options expire and proceeds are reinvested. We consider at most 24 of those
quarters, since the results that we obtain in our simulations are all within
this horizon.
The fact that options are kept until expiration (or 3 months) in our sce-
nario, instead of being sold before is not restrictive. Indeed, since the current
reselling price of the option reﬂects any loss-gain incurred during the exer-
6cise, the reinvestment of the realized gain-loss into similar assets would not
aﬀect the portfolio value since the underlyings follow a L´ evy process.
2.3 Price evolution of underlyings
In this section, we describe the underlying assets on which the options are
written. Before describing the laws of motion of the underlyings, we deﬁne
κ ∈ {e,a,l,c} to be an index denoting the class of options the underlying
is assigned to as described earlier, and j = 1,...,100 to uniquely describe
the option within the class of options κ. The simulation involves a set of
400 diﬀerent underlyings, exhibiting 0-pairwise correlation with any other
underlyings, whose price processes in a risk-neutral world are described by
the following stochastic diﬀerential equations










where St is the price of the underlying at time t, νt > 0 is the instantaneous
variance of the underlying assumed to be stochastic, W i
t (i = 1,2) are in-
dependent Brownian motions with law N(0,t) for every time t, and δ, β,
σν are positive parameters to be determined later. The variable I captures
the intensity of reversion of the variable St to its mean value r (the risk-free
interest rate), in the sense that the higher I the stronger the reversion eﬀect.
The variable I will be called the intensity of mean-reversion through-
out. Our analysis comes down to observing how an increase in I aﬀects the
downside risk of the portfolio formation described earlier. Every underlying
7is assumed to be statistically independent of any other, and thus a more ac-
curate description of the law of motion of those prices should have speciﬁed
the class of the underlying and its identiﬁcation within this class; this abuse
of notation is meant to simplify the exposition.
This model is taken from Heston [6]. It allows for the volatility of the
underlying asset to be randomly determined, and assumes that it follows
a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (Eq. 2). This model also has the critically
important empirical property that stochastic volatility and returns are cor-
related. The Heston model is much more accurate in describing observed
option prices than other standard models such as the Black-Scholes model
(see Bakshi [1]); this fact alone justiﬁes our focus on this type of dynamics.
Standard empirical ﬁndings suggest that the value σν = 0.189, α = 0.094,
β = 12.861, and δ = 0.01 provide the best ﬁt. We will also assume that
r = .05, ν0 = .45 and the initial stock price is S0 = 50.
We need a discretized version of the continuous-time process described in
Eq. (1) and (2) to carry out our numerical simulations. We use the common
approximation Wt+∆t − Wt ≈ 
√
∆t for every small enough time variation
∆t, where  is a random variable with law N(0,1) generating the jumps (see
Karatzas and Shreve [8] for a justiﬁcation). Using the independence of time
increments in Brownian motions, both for the prices St and the instantaneous
volatility, the law of motion above can be eﬀectively approximated by
8St+1 = St + I ∗ (r − δ)St∆t + St1
p
νt∆t, (3)
dνt+1 = νt + (α − βνt)∆t + 2σν
p
νt∆t (4)
for every sequence of times 0 < t0 < ... < tn. We will consider our standard
time horizon of T = 3 months, and we will assume that there are 15 jumps
of equal length within those 3 months for every underlying. In order to
eﬃciently simulate the dynamical system described in Eq. (3) and (4), we
ﬁrst need to simulate the stochastic variance in Eq. (4), and then to use
the calculated sequence of volatilities into Eq. (3). The underlyings thus
diﬀer by the nature of the realized jumps i (i = 1,2), and those jumps are
independent.
Given the previous assumptions, it is now possible to calculate the risk-
neutral prices of the options described above by using numerical methods.
We use a standard Monte-Carlo simulation to calculate the risk-neutral prices
of the derivatives, and this simulation is independent of the simulation for
the evolution of the portfolio (see Glasserman [4] Chapters 4-5 or Hull [7]
Chapter 22 for an introduction to the methods used here). The results are
given in Table 1.
3 Statistical results
We now give the results of our Monte-Carlo simulations. In a ﬁrst step, we
establish the likelihood of reaching a pre-determined loss level at least once
9Table 1: Monte-Carlo estimations of the risk-neutral prices of the options,
as a function of the mean-reversion intensity. Codes are written in R (see R
project [12]). Figures between brackets are the variances of the estimators.
Estimators are calculated with N=100,000 simulations.
Intensity cash-or-nothing lookback call Asian call European call
I=1 5.236236 6.004019 3.426517 4.463828
(0.049288) (0.059827) (0.048395) (0.065198)
I=5 5.0668 7.471425 4.076399 5.787401
(0.01560) (0.066783) (0.052746) (0.074305)
I=10 6.061753 9.516904 4.953797 7.684566
(0.048083) (0.074063) (0.057426) (0.08416)
before the end of the 24 quarters as a function of the intensity of mean-
reversion. This event would correspond to the activation of a stop-loss strat-
egy, thus a portfolio liquidation as described in Leoni [10], had this strategy
been implemented. In a second step, we determine the expected quarter
where the previous losses are recorded, again as a function of the intensity
of mean-reversion. This exercise allows us to see how critically sensitive the
downside risk of derivative portfolios is to an increase in the intensity of
mean-reversion.
103.1 Failure rate and mean-reversion intensity
We now turn to describing how the intensity of mean-reversion aﬀects the
likelihood of reaching a pre-determined loss level before the end of our horizon
of 24 quarters. We deﬁne the failure rate of a given simulation to be the
number of scenarii where a pre-determined loss level has been reached at least
once, divided by the total number of scenarii. The investment scenario has
been simulated N = 2500 times, and Monte-Carlo estimators of activation
times are reported for three levels of mean-reversion intensity.
Table 2 below gives the results for three levels of mean-reversion intensity,
(I = 1,5 and 10), and for various levels of pre-determined losses. The point
is to cross-compare the failure rates associated with a given intensity level.
The main result to notice is that, for every loss level, the higher the inten-
sity the lower the failure rate. It turns out that the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant and large for high loss levels (15% losses and above), although it
appears as minor for lower loss levels. For instance, the diﬀerence is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at 5% loss level for the intensity levels I = 1 and I = 5,
but the reduction is statistically signiﬁcant and important for I = 10. In
contrast, the failure rate is roughly halved at 30% loss level for the intensity
levels I = 5 and I = 10, unambiguously showing the major improvement in
downside risk reduction when doubling the intensity. It is also surprising to
notice that the reduction in downside risk is sensible when switching from
I = 1 to I = 5, at least for large enough loss levels, but the improvements are
largely felt at every loss level only when switching to the highest intensity
11Table 2: Failure rates as a function of the loss level, for various levels of
intensity. Figures between brackets are the variances of the estimators. Es-
timators are calculated with N=2500 simulations.
Loss level
Intensity .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3
I = 1 66.7 54.8 49.8 33.7 25.1 19
(0.942) (0.994) (0.992) (0.944) (0.942) (0.784)
I = 5 66.64 53.56 40.44 28.88 22.28 14.44
(0.95) (0.96) (0.95) (0.832) (0.703) (0.703)
I = 10 59.12 41.2 29.2 19.44 13.64 7.64
(0.95) (0.94) (0.908) (0.79) (0.78) (0.53)
level I = 10. The numbers are presented in Fig. 1 to have for more intuition.
3.2 First quarter of failure and intensity
We now determine the expected ﬁrst quarter where a given loss level is
recorded, for the same mean-reversion intensities as before. This event
would correspond to the expected date where a stop-loss strategy would
be activated. We consider three intensity levels, (I = 1,5 and 10), and pre-
determined loss levels ranging from 5% to 30%. The ﬁrst expected quarter
where a loss level is reached, together with the variance of those estimators,
are given in Table 3.
12Table 3: Expected ﬁrst quarter when a given loss level is reached, for var-
ious levels of intensity. Figures between brackets are the variances of the
estimators. Estimators are calculated with N=2500 simulations.
Loss level
Intensity .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3
I = 1 11.0044 14.2504 16.8924 18.9656 20.7284 21.7828
(0.2) (0.195) (0.179) (0.157) (0.128) (0.104)
I = 5 11.2228 14.7172 17.4812 19.9288 21.192 22.4344
(0.199) (0.192) (0.174) (0.143) (0.118) (0.087)
I = 10 12.4828 16.886 19.3708 21.3964 22.3676 23.2264
(0.205) (0.185) (0.156) (0.117) (0.092) (0.061)
The main result is that the expected quarter of the ﬁrst hit at a given
loss level is an increasing function of the intensity level, for every loss level.
That is; the higher the intensity level the longer the expected time needed to
reach this loss level. It is important to notice that, for low loss levels inferior
to 10%, the time diﬀerence is barely statistically signiﬁcant between I = 1
and I = 5. This time diﬀerence becomes signiﬁcant, for every loss level, only
when considering I = 10. When considering losses greater than 15%, the
improvement in postponing the ﬁrst expected time when those losses occur
becomes clear when increasing the intensity level. The numbers are presented
in Fig. 2 to have more intuition.
134 Conclusion
We have simulated a standard management strategy involving the use of
derivatives. The objective of the simulation is to estimate the downside of this
management strategy, and to isolate factors capable of reducing this downside
risk. The simulations are based on the assumption that the underlyings
exhibit mean-reversion, a feature that receive large empirical support.
The main ﬁnding is that the higher the intensity of mean-reversion, the
lower the probability of reaching a pre-determined loss level. This phe-
nomenon is observed for every loss level that we consider, although it appears
of large statistical signiﬁcance for large loss levels (15% and above). The sec-
ond ﬁnding is that the higher the mean-reversion intensity, the longer the
expected time to reach those loss levels. The simulations suggest that select-
ing underlyings with high mean-reversion eﬀect is a natural way to reduce
the downside risk of derivative portfolios.
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